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Introduction
The air transport industry has become a key factor of economic activity. Air transport generates significant social and economic benefits related to trade, employment, investment, tourism and leisure opportunities. However, like most human activities, air transport also generates less welcome external effects, among which noise pollution is probably the most salient one. Noise-induced disturbances constitute a hot and topical societal problem for all major airports. Indeed, there seem to be no clear solutions to the issues about how to accommodate the residents suffering from noise damages and about how to accordingly determine the number and the distribution of aircraft movements around the airports.
Intriguingly, the economic literature has neglected to discuss the design of policy instruments that could efficiently balance social cost of noise pollution and economic benefits of airport economic activity. While many discussions have focused on technological improvements (quieter airplanes, alternative land-off and kick-off procedures) or on the definition of noise standards, they have not addressed the question of social optimality.
2
It is well-known that command-and-control policies do not lead to social optimality in the context of asymmetric information, which is relevant to airport regulation since information about residents' noise disutility is 1 Another topical external impact is its contribution to climate change (air transport contributes to 3 percent of world greenhouse gases emissions). To cope with this problem, air transport sector will soon be included in the emission targets negotiated under the Kyoto protocol and in the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) which regulates carbon dioxide emissions.
2 See for instance Janic (1999) and Brueckner (2003) . Brueckner and Girvin (2007) discuss the optimal taxation of aircrafts given a fixed global quota of noise emissions but do not consider the social cost of residents' noise exposure.
difficult to collect (we shall come back to that point). Even though, in some situations, regulators have been able to create noise abatement incentives by imposing different fees in function of the (theoretical) noise pressures of aircraft categories, they have been unable (or unwilling) to calibrate those fees to the actual noise disutility of the residents surrounding airports. In fact, the efficiency of such fees has not been established. Still, even if the optimal fee were implemented, it would neither solve the problem of spatial distribution of aircraft movements around airports, nor the issue of efficient compensations to the noise victims.
It is often argued that residents are already compensated for the social cost of noise damage by lower housing rents and prices. Yet, the fact that residents are compensated does not imply that social costs are internalized. Whereas such costs can be shifted from tenants to landlords who are bound to offer lower house rents, they are generally not shifted to the firms that generate the noise externality.
Except in the rare situations where airports acquire the surrounding properties, 3 the social costs of noise pollution are not internalized and there exists a need to design economic instruments that organize such an internalization.
The debate about the internalization of social costs is well-known to economists.
Noting the reciprocal nature of harmful effects, Coase (1960) suggested to define appropriate property rights over the source of those effects and showed that regulation can be accomplished effectively and efficiently by a market. The present paper applies this idea in the context of noise pollution and airport activity. We propose noise licenses as the means of the negotiation between residents and airline compa- 3 To our knowledge, Flughafen Dusseldorf is one airport which has pursued a policy of house purchase in noisy areas. Some airports have been relocated in housing free areas (e.g. Oslo,
Montreal-Mirabel).
nies. In order to compensate the residents for noise damage the property rights will be assigned to them. By selling those rights on a market, the residents will express their willingness to accept noise. The contribution of our paper is to show how a local market for noise licenses allows to implement the socially optimal number of flights and their spatial distribution among routes.
The market for noise licenses is organized as follows. Residents are organized by zones that sell noise licenses to airline companies. Each noise license consists in a right for one aircraft to fly over a specific zone during some time period. The supply of licenses is set by the zones and bounded only by technical feasibility.
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A (neutral) auctioneer collects the bids of zones' supplies and airline companies' demands, determines the price that clears the market and redistributes the licenses according to the bids. In equilibrium, the price of noise licenses is equal to both the marginal profit of the additional flight from/to the airport and to the disutility of additional noise disturbance in the more disturbed areas. Like any other market for tradeable licenses, this market for noise licenses offers a distinct advantage over traditional instruments like command-and-control, urban planning or fees. Once the market is adequately designed it reaches an equilibrium in which social benefit of the airlines' activity is balanced with its social costs. Because residents have full rights to issue noise licenses, they are never worse-off. At the same time, the social costs of noise pollution are internalized through the purchase of noise licenses by airline companies. This makes void the debate about airport noise pollution and local governments need no longer be involved in cumbersome information collection/studies on noise damage or in political arbitrage between supporters of environmental qual- 4 The maximal number of licenses is equal to the maximal number of movements the airport can sustain during the specified time period.
ity and airport economic activity. Thus, a local market where airline companies and airport residential neighbors can trade noise licenses provides governments with an efficient instrument to correct the aircraft noise externalities.
Designing a market for licenses in the context of noise pollution raises many theoretical challenges. The first one relates to the complementarity of zones over the routes. This complementarity results from the fact that, to fly over a route an aircraft needs to buy the licenses of all the zones of that route. We show that zones always supply a positive number of noise licenses and that no zone is willing to block the airplane traffic. The impact of a specific zone on the license price is limited by the presence of competing zones located on different routes. The second challenge relates to the spatial dimension of our market. In particular, we analyze how the design of zones and routes shapes the market equilibrium. We show that there exists a large class of feasible designs and that, under some conditions, it is possible for the market designer to replicate the socially optimal number and spatial distribution of flights with an appropriate design. The third challenge relates to the possibility for planes to fly over different jurisdictions where local governments' objectives naturally differ. We show that an optimal design is still possible, provided that the jurisdiction hosting the airport is the marker designer. The fourth challenge relates to the possibility for zones' representatives to be strategic. Interestingly, the presence of such behaviors does not threaten the whole airport activity, it only reduces the set of parameters for which the planner's solution can be implemented.
The last challenge is to capture the long run effects of the market for noise licenses on the urban structure. The market for noise licenses is likely to increase the population density in the noisy areas. On the other hand the local economic benefits of airports are generally significant, covering tax revenues and direct and indirect employment opportunities. As soon as airport expansion is to be discussed, these issues become much trickier. Opening of new runways typically exacerbate the dilemma between noise concern and economic benefits. According to the US Federal Aviation Administration,
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18 of the 31 large hub airports in the US plan to add runways in the next decade. On the other hand, 5 This means an environmental cost of about $2400 (2000 Euros) per 100-seat aircraft flight over 1000 km. 6 A unit of acoustic decibel (dBA) is a (logarithmic) measure of the sound pressure and therefore of the intensity of a sound perceived by humans. Because a sound is perceived differently according to its frequency, sound pressures are corrected by a "A weighting filter". 7 Source: US Department of transportation.
Brueckner (2003) estimates that the O'Hare expansion would raise service related employment in the Chicago area by 185,000 jobs. Yet, again, this literature on costs and benefits of airport activity and noise pollution does not address the problem of internalization of the externality between aircrafts, airports and residents.
One may also wonder about the ability or the willingness of governments and relevant institutions to implement the optimal number and spatial distribution of aircraft movements. In 2001, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Assembly endorsed the concept of a "balanced approach" to aircraft noise management. however broader than those of ICAO as the Commission seeks to limit or reduce the number of people significantly affected by the harmful effects of noise, and to achieve maximum environmental benefit in the most cost-effective manner. The cost-effectiveness of the policy is clearly claimed but the choice of the instrument to implement the policy remains open. This is the very purpose of this article to propose an appropriate one.
Finally, our contribution with a market for noise licenses also relates to envi- Hence, the environmental economic literature generally discusses the efficiency properties of allocation of pollution quotas in a secondary market where a government has no information about the firms cost structure and distribute permits (or quotas) to polluters, like in Montgomery (1972) . Designing rules for initial allocations of pollution permits (or quotas) has remained a critical issue of information revelation until the particular auction mechanism recently proposed by Montero (2007) . However, such mechanisms cannot be applied to our context because the 9 The vocabulary used in the literature is sometimes loose, here. As noted by Montero (2007) , the word licenses usually refers to permits or allowances in water and air pollution control, while rights are used in water supply management and quotas in fisheries management. We will use licenses throughout the paper.
government has no more information about individuals noise damage function than about each airline company business structure.
In contrast to this literature, we consider the design of a primary local market for noise licenses that includes, like in Coase (1960) , both local victims (the residents) and polluters (the aircraft companies). We give a particular focus on a design that makes the airport activity acceptable to neighboring residents. Since the latter are victims of aircraft noise disturbances, this naturally implies that property rights on noise (or quietness) are granted to those residents. They are then free to transfer those rights to aircraft companies by the means of noise licenses. Hence, the regulator does not impose any arbitrary global noise quota. By contrast, under some conditions, we will show that there exists market designs that implement the socially optimal number and allocation of air traffic amongst aircraft routes, and that it does not require the regulator's intervention after the creation of the market.
This article offers an contribution that is both policy-oriented and methodological. It presents an original and efficient policy instrument to regulate noise pollution around airports. It proposes a new application of the concept of tradeable licenses to the issue of noise exposure, with an emphasis on the spatial dimension of the problem.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setting while Section 3 derives and discusses our proposal for a market for noise licenses. Section 4 proposes the optimal market design in the standard case of price taking zones. In Sections 5 and 6, two extensions are considered, one where aircrafts fly over independent jurisdictions, and the other where zones' representatives behave strategically. In all cases we will see that the optimal solution can be implemented, but under specific conditions. Section 7 develops the short run and long run equilibria and shows how the market for noise licenses shapes the city structure. The conclusion follows.
2 The setting
The airport
Let us consider a civil airport located in the neighborhood of a large city. Air traffic is organized along several routes that airplanes may take when they land and take off.
Landing and take-off routes are determined by exogenous technical characteristic, in particular the direction of wind. Yet, within the same set of technical parameters, there exist several route possibilities. For example, after the take-off, aircrafts may remain at low altitude, or go up, and they may go right or left. We denote R and R the set and the number of all technically possible routes (R = #R ≥ 1). We denote R (R ⊆ R) and R (R ≤ R) the set and number of routes that are actually used.
Along a route r ∈ R, airplanes generate noise pollution that varies according to their altitude and acceleration. Because we are particularly interested in the problem of spatial distribution of flights, we set aside the issue of aircrafts heterogeneity. Let t be the distance from the airport on a given route and let y r be the number of planes on route r.
The residents
The residents are homogenous with respect to their disutility for noise pollution but they differ according to their distance t from the airport. Thus, a resident i located on route r is endowed with an individual utility function equal to U i r (t, y r ) = I This disutility firstly depends on the distance from the airport: in general, the closer to the airport, the worse are the noise damages. It secondly depends on the number of flights. For simplicity we assume that d r (t, y r ) = δ r (t)y 2 r /2 where δ r (t) is a location-noise disutility parameter on that route. The parameter δ(t) reflects the loss of utility suffered by a resident when an aircraft flights over the location t on route r. So, δ(t) is typically larger in locations where aircraft have lower altitude, boost engine power and/or use flaps. This parameter depends on the profile of the route, which we take as given. The population size at location t on route r is n r (t). Let β r (t) = δ r (t)n r (t) be the total disutility parameter at location t on route r and let T r be the distance at which noise pollution is no longer considered.
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One then computes the aggregate disutility parameter on route r as B r (t) ≡ t 0 β r (t)dt. Figure 2 provides an example of the distribution of the total disutility parameter on a route. It is important to observe that whereas individuals located close to the airport have higher disutility δ(t), the total disutility parameter β(t) may be higher elsewhere because of a larger population density there. 10 The profile of a route includes the altitude, direction, speed and acceleration of aircraft that are prescribed in landing and taking-off procedures.
11 Residential areas with low or zero noise pollution are not considered for noise contention issues. Typically, this applies to areas with an annual average noise level lower than 55 decibels (L dn ). We also consider homogenous noise pressures amongst aircraft categories. When aircraft are heterogenous in noise pressures, the parameter δ r (t) relates to the 'average' noise disutility at location t on route r.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 
The first-best
It is instructive to derive the allocation of flights under a command and control policy where a planner determines the number and the distribution of flights over possible routes under perfect information. The planner maximizes a weighted sum of profits and resident utility. Its problem is to find the set of routes R and the allocation of flights {y r } such that
Incentives for noise abatement may be introduced by requiring airlines to purchase shares of noise licenses that are proportional to the aircraft noise pressure or, in practice, set in accordance to the noise 'quota count' defined for each aircraft.
where γ is the weight the planner puts on profit. It is zero when profits do not accrue to local residents. It can be larger than one when the airport activity generates consumer surplus or additional peripheral activity.
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When some share of consumption and profits accrues to individuals that do not belong to the jurisdiction of the planner, the latter would set a smaller γ.
The first order conditions read γ (π − y) = y r B r , ∀r ∈ R. The planner's solution yields the following total number of flights and its distribution amongst routes:
and y o r
The optimal number of flights y Thus, neither command-and-control nor fees seem adequate to optimally regulate noise pollution around airports. Alternative policy instruments are required. In the following we discuss the implementation of this optimal allocation of flights with a market for noise licenses. Such a market would not only implement the optimal flight's allocation but would also compensate residents for noise damage.
A market for noise licenses
We consider a market solution such as the one proposed by Coase (1960) . That is, we define the property rights to benefit from a quiet environment and we give them to the residents.
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Residents are allowed to transfer those rights to airline companies by selling noise licenses. Montgomery (1972) has proved that, under perfect competition such a market yields the socially efficient solution. We make Montgomery's (1972) assumption that firms and zone representatives are price takers. We also assume the presence of a 'neutral auctioneer' who collects bids until he/she finds an equilibrium.
The main feature of our market for noise licenses is its spatial dimension. Resi- 14 It is well-known that, under the Coase Theorem, the optimal solution is reached whatever the allocation of property rights. Distributional effects will differ, however. 
The supply and demand for noise licenses
In each zone the representative is allowed to sell noise licenses at a price p rz . To have one flight passing over the zone z ∈ Z r during a specified time period, an airline company must buy one license at that price.
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Hence to take the route r the 15 The attributes of the specified time period can be day/night, or smaller time periods, working days/week-ends. In case of several time periods, airlines redistribute their flight activity according the price of noise licenses in each time period. For the sake of exposition, this paper focuses on a airline company must purchase the bundle of zones' licenses for a total the price of P r ≡ z p rz . We assume that the zone's representative is utilitarian and considers the following aggregate utility function:
One can write
where
is a parameter measuring the total disutility over the zone. Notice that aggregate disutility depends both on individual utility function and population size in that zone. Given that the amount of money raised by the zone is equal to p rz y rz , the representative's utility is given by
For the moment, we assume that representatives are price takers. So, each representative maximizes this function by choosing the amount of licenses to sell and considering the price p rz as a given. The first order condition is equal to p rz = α rz y rz , which yields the following supply of licenses
The demand for noise licenses comes from airline companies. We assume that flights are managed by independent profit maximizing companies. The latter have market defined over a single time period.
to purchase a bundle of noise licenses to take a route. The profit function of the flight x ∈ [0, π] is now π(x) = π − x − P r where P r is the cost of taking route r. The demand for licenses is therefore given by
The equilibrium
We now define the role of the auctioneer in the market for noise licenses. The latter collects supply and demand bids from residents and firms and is in charge of finding an equilibrium price. As for any competitive market we assume that the only information the auctioneer gets is the number of license bids of residents and firms on each route. As a consequence, the auctioneer is not allowed to discriminate across zones. In our setting, this has a particular implication: the auctioneer must propose the same price for all zones located on a given route. Formally,
The licenses supplied by different zones over a same route are perfect complement for airline companies. At a given set of prices, the total supply is given by the most restrictive use of the route in every zone. That is,
Finally, the instruments in that market design include the set of open routes, R ⊆R, and the definition of zones, {T r } r∈R . 
Such an equilibrium implies that there exists no allocation of routes that, at prevailing prices, would be preferred by any airline company or by any zone's representative. It also means that no resources are lost, given that the auctioneer makes no profit.
In this market equilibrium, the zone with the highest total disutility offers the smallest number of licenses and thus it determines the number of flights over a route.
We call this zone the critical zone. This can be seen by using the supply function defined above,
is a parameter measuring the total disutility over the critical zone. Equating this supply function with demand yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium in the market for noise licenses exists and is unique.
It is such that,
Given that y
Proof. See appendix. In equilibrium the two effects exactly balance.
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Finally, it is easy to construct examples where the market designer adds new zones but reduces the size of critical zones so that the equilibrium license price falls and the number of flights increases.
Actually, in the design of zones, the number of zones and the size of the critical zones are, to some extent, substitute instruments.
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The properties of the market for noise licenses crucially depend on the complementarity of noise pollution on each route. Indeed, noise pollution is a complementary bad for all zones on the same route since aircrafts must fly over all those zones. Typically, this may lead to a "tragedy of the commons" where agents do not internalize the global effect of their decisions. In our context, each residents' representative owns the right to issue noise licenses and does not internalize the benefits and damages that other zones bear. One may conjecture that the number of licenses and flights is inefficient. Another way to see this is to observe that noise licenses offered by different zones on a same route are complementary goods. Therefore the market for noise licenses may be suspected to be subject to Cournot's conjecture about under-provision of complementary goods. In this conjecture, independent suppliers of complementary goods would set inefficiently high price levels because they would not internalize the effect of their decisions on others. In our setting, those effects exist but are under the control of the market designer. By defining the zones, the latter is able to tune this effect and is also able to set the level of flight activity. The market designer neutralizes those effects by designing homogenous zones (α rz ≡ α r ≡ B r /Z r ). In this case the creation of new zones is balanced with a smaller disutility in the zones, which leaves prices and flight activity unchanged.
Because the division of routes into heterogenous zones allows the market designer to tune the total air traffic, it constitutes an important aspect of the design of a market for noise licenses. In the following we show that this market allows the implement the social planner's solution.
An optimal market design
The market designer has a considerable degree of freedom in the divisions of routes into zones. It then is natural to ask whether and when an appropriate market design leads to the social planner's outcome in terms of route allocation and total number of flights. In our market for noise licenses the planner has the ability to choose two sets of instruments: the routes and the definition of zones. In this section we show the condition under which the market designer is able to implement the social planner's optimal solution by an adequate choice of these instruments. To this end, we compare the first best allocation with the competitive equilibrium. We do this, first, in the general setting. Then, we simplify the market design by imposing that all zones have equal length in all routes.
The generic case
The instruments for the market design include the set of routes R ∈ R and the definition of zones {T r }. We say that the planner can implement the optimal number (1) and (4),
The efficient activity level will be reached if and only if y * = y o , that is, by using
(1) and (3),
These two equalities imply that
Furthermore, plugging expression (7) in (5) it is easy to find a design of zones such that this function α r Z r is made equal to any real number above B r . As a result there always exists a design of zone such that the value α r Z r lies above B r . From this argument, it comes that the market designer will be able to find a design of zones that verifies condition (7) Proof. See Appendix.
Under Proposition 2 the market designer is able to implement its optimal allocation of flights by an appropriate design of zones only if he/she does not put too large a weight on the airport economic activity. In this case, he/she prefers a low aircraft activity and he/she can raise either the number of non-critical zones or the size of the critical zones so that the price of noise licenses increases. The number of zones and the size of the critical zones are therefore substitutable instruments, which gives the planner some freedom in the market design. By contrast, the planner is not able to implement its optimal solution with a market for noise licenses when he/she puts too high a weight on profits or economic activities (γ > 1). In this case, he/she desires a flight activity that conflicts too strongly with the residents' interest. Residents indeed set prices of noise licenses that are too high and the aircraft activity remains too small compared to the optimal level even if the planner has reduced the price of flying over a route to its minimal value (by setting Z r = 1).
It is interesting to discuss the situation where noise pollution is uniformly distributed over each route. For instance, this may happen when aircrafts keep the same altitude on neighborhoods. In this case, the location-noise disutility parameter is constant on each route: δ r (t) = δ r . So, condition (7) writes as It also is interesting to discuss the dual situation where the population density is uniform over each route. This case approximates the situation where one route passes over a highly populated city and another route passes over a less dense sprawl.
In this case, the population density is constant on each route: n r (t) = n r . So, condition (7) becomes
Here, the market design requires only information on noise profiles and individual disutility of noise exposure. Assuming that noise levels are proportionally reflected in the individual disutility of noise exposure, the market designer can base his/her design of zones on the noise profiles.
In Proposition 2 the number of zones and the boundaries of critical zones are two substitutable instruments. Imposing a restriction on one of these instruments does not necessarily prevents the market designer from implementing the social optimum.
For instance, if the number of zones Z r cannot be freely chosen, the market designer is still able to choose the boundaries of the critical zone (i.e. choose α r ). Conversely, if the critical zones cannot be freely chosen, then he/she is still able to choose the number of zones such that condition (7) holds. However, one may wonder about the feasibility of the implementation of the social optimum allocation when the market designer faces some constraints on both instruments. Of course, when the zones are exogenously defined, for instance by administrative boundaries, the market designer has no degree of freedom in his/her design and the social optimum cannot be implemented. In the following sections, we consider an intermediate situation in
which the market design is still possible but for a smaller set of parameters.
An example of restricted design
Let us consider for expositional purposes the case of an additional constraint that imposes that routes must have equal lengths, T r ≡ T , and equal number of zones, Z r ≡ Z. As a result, routes are divided into equal intervals, t z−1 − t z = T /Z.
Because this restriction simultaneously fixes the number and the boundaries of zones, it reduces the market designer's degree of freedom. By equation (7) we get that,
which must be compatible with Z ≥ 1. We remind that the function α r Z is bounded 
(T /Z).
As a result, α r Z tends to T β max r when Z → ∞. The market designer is then able to implement the optimal number and allocation of flights with a market for noise licenses if B r /γ takes any value between these two bounds. This argument yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose the market designer is constrained to design zones and routes with equal lengths. Then, the socially optimal allocation of flights can be implemented by a market for noise licenses if and only if
Hence, the constraint of zones of equal length does not eliminate the possibility of implementation of the social optimum via a market for noise licenses, but it reduces the set of parameters γ for which this is possible. The market designer is not able to implement the optimal allocation of flights when γ is too low because he/she is unable to design a set of zones that induces a high enough price of noise licenses and thus a low enough aircraft activity. However, the restriction on equal lengths of zones obliges him/her to reduce at the same time the size and the total disutility of critical zones, which has the effect of decreasing the price of noise licenses.
In this section we have analyzed the design of markets for noise licenses and we have established the conditions under which a market designer can implement the socially optimal allocation of flight under the three following conditions: all zones belong to the same jurisdiction, all zone representatives are price takers and the spatial distribution of residents is given. We relax each of these assumptions in the following sections.
Flights over independent jurisdictions
In some situations airport noise pollution may cover different jurisdictions with conflicting interests. The airport may for instance bring local benefits to only one jurisdiction (employment, accessibility, ...) whereas flights pass over zones that belong to some other jurisdictions. One example is the case of the Brussels Airport (Belgium) that offers large job opportunities to the Flemish region and that dispatches flights over both the Flemish and Brussels regions. In many respects, the two regions' governments are independent institutions. Such a case can be handled in our setting. In this section, we establish the conditions under which a market for noise licenses can be an appropriate economic instrument for the jurisdiction that hosts the airport, receives the major part of its benefits and designs the market.
We assume two jurisdictions A and B, with jurisdiction A hosting the airport. We also assume that jurisdiction A is not altruistic with respect to jurisdiction B's residents and that it has a share of economic returns: γ
When jurisdiction A plans its optimal airport activity, it maximizes ]. Hence, if jurisdiction A gets a small enough share of economic benefits it will plan a flight activity smaller than the multi-jurisdictional planner's.
The second expression shows that flight allocation on a route decreases as noise pollution over jurisdiction A's territory increases. In particular, jurisdiction A will allocate a large proportion of flights on the routes that pass over few residents of its jurisdiction (small B A r ). We now ask whether jurisdiction A is able to implement its own social optimal allocation of flights while not making jurisdiction B worse off. Because a market for noise licenses cannot make residents in any zone worse off, residents of jurisdiction B surely have an interest to accept the implementation of such a market. Therefore, the question simply becomes whether a market designer is able to choose the design of routes and zones that implements jurisdiction A's social optimal allocation of flights.
For a given design of routes and zones, the market satisfies the same conditions as in Proposition 1. As in Section 4.1, the airport activity depends on the number and the design of zones and routes, which can be chosen to satisfy the optimal flight allocation for jurisdiction A's planner. Comparing the above expression to Proposition 1, jurisdiction A must choose a design such that
The argument is the same as in Section 4.1 except that there are two types of routes to consider. First, consider the routes that do not pass over jurisdiction B.
In that case we get that B A r = B r and that expression (8) . Because the aircraft activity is fixed to {y A r }, the noise disutility is fixed everywhere. For the same reason, the demand is fixed to y A and the price of routes is given by a same value P . As a result, the profits of airline companies are also fixed. Therefore, two terms of jurisdiction B's objectives, noise disutility and profits, are fixed. Jurisdiction B is nevertheless able to alter the last term in its objective related to the proceeds from noise licenses on each route: P y and α r to zero in order to keep the condition (8) binding. As a result, a jurisdiction is able to implement its optimal solution only if it receives the full authority on the market design. Even though the rights for a quiet environment are spatially distributed, the authority on the market design must be given to a single agency.
Non competitive markets
In the above market design, zone representatives and airlines companies were assumed to be price takers in the market for noise licenses. This assumption may be questioned. Indeed, some airlines companies may be price makers as they demand a large share of noise licenses. At the same time, some critical zones are likely to be price makers because the number of technically feasible routes is not expected to be that large, and because non-critical zones have no impact on the number of flights over routes. Because our paper focuses on the issue of granting noise licenses to residents, it is natural to concentrate our discussion on residents' market power.
Further, it is many times feared that residents would use their power to put a veto on airport activity. We therefore elaborate a game theoretic foundation for the market for noise licenses where the zone representatives can be strategic.
We propose a market design in which each zone representative simultaneously decides on a finite number of licenses to supply. The 'neutral auctioneer' allocates flights according to the minimum number of licenses on each route. This corresponds to a Cournot Nash equilibrium where zone representatives fix the number of flights.
In this section we show the conditions under which there exists a design of zones {T r } such that the social optimal allocation of flights can be implemented by a market for noise licenses under imperfect competition.
Let the utility of the zone representative be defined as U rz (y rz ) = p rz y rz −α rz y 2 rz /2 as before. Each representative sets a number of licenses y rz for his/her zone. The market auctioneer sets the number of licenses to its minimum over each route, y r = min z {y rz }; as before, he/she allocates the same price P = P r for all routes and all zones p rz = P/Z r ; and he/she balances supply r y r with demand y ≡ π − P .
Because the price on routes P depends on other zones, the utility in a zone will depend on other zones. Let y −rz be the set of supplies by all zones different from rz, i.e. y −rz ≡ {y ij } ij =rz . The utility of zone z's representative on route r is given by
where the market price is equal to We formally derive the best response correspondences and the equilibrium in the
Appendix. An informal proof is provided hereafter. The main idea is that noncritical zones are never enticed to supply less than critical zones' supply. So, the supply of critical zones binds in equilibrium. As a result, the supply of licenses on 
One can check that the number of flights falls with the number of zones Z r on a route r and with noise pollution in the critical zones, α r . Also, the routes that This is consistent with the fact that the critical zone on this route displays a higher marginal noise disutility and, as a result, has a lower supply elasticity of noise licenses. Similarly, one can study the case where critical zones have the same noise pollution parameters, α r = α. Then, a critical zone on a route with a larger number of zones will proportionally reduce less its offer of flights when it is able to exert its market power. Indeed, the revenue increase caused by the contraction of supply must be shared amongst more zones, so that incentives to exert market power are lower.
Is it possible to replicate the optimal number and allocation of flights under this non competitive equilibrium? In particular, one may expect that representatives of critical zones use their market power to reduce the flight activity below its socially optimal level. Comparing the non competitive equilibrium and the first best allocation yields the following proposition. Proof. See Appendix.
As in the case of perfectly competitive markets for noise licenses, the optimal allocation of flights can be replicated by the market. Yet, the higher market power of zone representatives reduces the set of parameters γ for which the market for noise licenses implements the first best. At a given design, critical zones offer less licenses in the non competitive markets, so that equilibrium prices are higher and flight activity smaller. Therefore, the same design under a non competitive market implies a smaller flight activity than under a competitive market.
7 Residential mobility and city structure given by the revenues of noise licenses, the disutility of noise, the utility and the 18 A similar analysis holds in the case of non competitive markets for noise licenses.
rent for residential space,
where R rz is the land rent (per acre). Because residents are homogenous they have the same use of space s rz . The zone's representative has an aggregate utility given by
Finally, let us assume that the residential area of each disturbed zone consists of a land strip with unit width and with a length of T rz = t r,z−1 − t r,z . So, T rz is both the length and the residential area of zone z on route r. In the long run, lot sizes cover the residential area so that T rz = n rz s rz .
We solve this game backwards, starting with the equilibrium in the market for noise licenses.
Short term
In the last period, the land rent R rz and the lot size s rz of each resident in zone z on route r are given. The representative asks for a financial compensation for the aircraft activity that maximizes his/her utility and the market for noise licenses clears. The first order condition is the same as in Section 3 and yields the same supply of noise licenses, y S rz = p rz /α rz . Hence, the market for noise licenses yields the same outcome; that is, the equilibrium price P * and the flight allocations y * r are given by Proposition 1. The identity of critical zones is still given by z = arg min z α rz .
The property rights on quietness give the residents a benefit that we call windfall gain. This corresponds to the additional utility each resident obtains from the sales of the licenses. Indeed, using (2) the total utility of the zone z's representative can be computed as
so that residents get a positive rent from the sale of noise licenses. Therefore, in equilibrium, resident i's utility is given by
which is positive, increases with the equilibrium price of noise licenses P * and falls as lot size s rz shrinks (and therefore population n rz rises).
The existence of windfall gains is well-known in the literature on environmental economics. It stems from the fact that a property right is given for free on a productive input which acquires a price when the market becomes operational. As the compensation offered by licenses is larger than the noise-induced loss of utility, residents earns a windfall gain. This is the very existence of windfall gains that shape medium and long term equilibria.
Mid term
In the second period, residents move across locations while the land prices R rz adjust. The lot sizes and critical zones are still fixed. Let V i o be residents' utility outside the disturbed zones. Reasonably, the city is supposed to be large enough so that residents' utility outside the disturbed zones, V i o , is independent of the land and the market for noise licenses in the disturbed zones. Empirical evidence supports this assumption in many cases.
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As soon as residents are mobile, they locate in 19 By using noise exposure maps for 35 major US airports, Morrison et al. (1999) 
Long term
In the first period, landlords decide on the lot size s rz . We assume a competitive land market where landlords are numerous and price takers. They do not consider others' behavior in their decision process. In particular, they do not anticipate the aggregate migration of residents that may result from their lot size choices. Hence, each landlord finds the optimal lot size s rz that maximizes his/her land rent R * rz given by (12) and taking the zone's population n rz as given. So, his/her optimal rent solves the following first order condition
By our assumption on v, the left hand side of this equality strictly increases from and above zero as the lot size s rz increases from zero. Therefore, landlords further Proof. See appendix.
In the long run landlords entice the residents located outside the disturbed zones to come in the disturbed areas and to share the windfall gains offered to residents.
Hence, the population size increases in these zones, raising in turn the price of noise licenses and reducing the flight activity in equilibrium.
Whereas the previous proposition compares lot and population sizes with their level without market for noise licenses, we now compare lot and population sizes between zones of different routes. Using expression (13) we have already established that landlords reduce lot sizes in zones earning larger windfall gains U i rz . Therefore, zones with higher population density will be associated to larger (individual) windfall
gains. Yet, population densities are determined by the long run equilibrium. The following proposition determines the relationship between those population densities and the characteristics of zones, namely their exposure to noise and their land supply. 
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition goes as it follows. First, landlords divide their lots in smaller parcels when residents benefit from high individual windfall gains. The population density is therefore higher in zones with larger windfall gains. Second, consider two zones of equal size. The one with the lower noise exposure will have the higher population density. This is because lower noise exposure increases windfall gains and entices landlords to attract more residents.
Finally, consider two zones with equal individual noise exposure. Then, the zone with the smaller area will have the higher population density in the long run.
Indeed, if the smaller area had the same population density, then it would host a smaller population and individual windfall gains would be larger there. This would entice landlords to attract additional residents, which would increase the population density in that zone. As a result, the population density is necessarily higher in the zone with the smaller area.
The above Proposition also gives us an additional message: the identity of critical zones may eventually be different in the short and in the long run because population densities are different.
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This result suggests that, in order to preserve the optimality 
Conclusion
The main strand of literature on noise pollution around airports has neglected the issue of policy design to make airport facilities internalize the negative externality to surrounding residents. In this paper we focus on Coase's (1960) idea to achieve this goal with a market for noise licenses. We suggest to organize residents in zones and to allow them to offer noise licenses that must be bought by airline companies to fly over their zones. In such a design the noise externality is internalized and residents can never be worse off with the airport traffic. Local governments need no longer be involved in cumbersome information collection/studies on noise damages and in political arbitrage between supporters of environmental quality and airport economic activity.
We show that the market for noise licenses allows to achieve the planner's optimal allocation of flights provided that she/he does not put too much weight on the In the long run, we then get α * rz > α * rz which is equivalent to δ rz T rz /s * rz > δ rz T rz /s * rz , or s * rz < s * rz or, by virtue of Proposition 6, is true iff T rz < T rz or equivalently iff δ rz > δ rz . That is, population density (1/s rz ) is larger in zones with higher individual noise disutility. In this case, only the zone with the highest individual noise disutility becomes critical in the long term although all zones are critical in the short run. As a result, in the long term changes in lot size and population density may alter the identity of critical zones.
benefits of the economic activity compared to the disutility of noise pollution. The possibility that some zones may be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this finding. In the long run, because the market auctioneer is not allowed to perfectly discriminate, noise licenses offer a windfall gain to residents located on the routes.
This entices landlords to increase their land/house rents and to set smaller houses in the long run.
This article proposes an original solution to the regulation of noise pollution around airports. Further research must be undertaken on additional issues like, for example, the possible cooperative behaviors of zones, the dominance of some airline companies in the market for licenses, a finer organization of the market place (auctioneer's task/algorithm), weather constraints, the heterogeneity of aircraft noise levels and the heterogeneity of residents. 
Appendices
Proof of Proposition 1 Demands for noise licenses are non-increasing and supplies are non-decreasing functions of prices P r . There thus exists a unique equilibrium.
Because on every route r, supply is smaller than demand at P r = 0, the equilibrium price is interior (P r > 0). Therefore, in equilibrium, routes have same price: P r = 
This yields equations (3) and (4).
Proof of Proposition 2 Let F (T r ) be the function that returns the value of α r Z r for any design of zones T r on route r. We just need to prove that F is defined over [B r , ∞). We first prove that there exists a design of zones, T r , such that α r Z r can be made equal to any real number above B r . That is, ∀x ≥ B r , ∃T r such that F (T r ) = x. This is true for the following possible design T r . It is such that the number of zones Z r is set to the integer strictly above [x/B r ], the boundaries of the critical zone z are set so that α r = x/Z r and the boundaries of other zones z are set so that α r > α rz . Second, we prove that F (T r ) is not bounded from above. Indeed, choose for instance a critical zone with small length εT r (ε > 0) that includes the location t 
This best response decreases with the aggregate noise pollution α rz . Second, suppose that zone zr is not the critical zone on route r but that zone rz (rz = rz) is critical.
Therefore, we must have that α rz < α rz and y rz (y −rz ) > y rz (y −rz ). In this case, zone rz is indifferent to any offer higher than y rz (y −rz ) since such offers will not change the number of flights on route r. Also, zone rz will not offer any number 
